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This thesis examines Russia’s reaction to the recent electoral revolutions and 
mass protest movements across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, all of which 
the Russians labeled “color revolutions.” More explicitly, it analyzes Russian 
understanding of the color revolution threat, the Russian security forces’ actions to 
address vulnerabilities to the threat, the non-military actions taken to minimize the threat, 
and the military efforts made to both support and to gain the support of Russia’s regional 
allies. 
Russia’s understanding and reaction to the color revolution threat is one largely 
driven by the West’s perceived role in color revolutions. Russia has succeeded in 
severing the ties between Western democratization efforts and Russian civil society, 
while Russia’s new National Guard strengthens the tie between the Kremlin and the 
country’s internal coercive forces. However, Russia’s military has largely not reacted to 
the threat, and the country’s efforts to gain allies against the threat have received only 
half-hearted support. Overall, Russia’s anti-color revolution strategy, if it can be called a 
strategy, has been executed unevenly across the various ministries; but understanding 
how Russia perceives and reacts to the threat is essential, especially if Russia uses what it 
has learned to foment a color revolution in a NATO country. 
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Somewhere in a windowless room in the basement of the Pentagon, a group of 
men and women high-fived themselves for their successful operation to bring down 
Slobodan Milosevic.1 This group, made up of members of the Department of Defense, 
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the 
Central Intelligence Agency, appeared to have perfected the method of uniting a political 
opposition by using mass protest and propaganda to bring down an anti-American 
government with an unconstitutional coup. Did this occur? Probably not, but it appears to 
be the scene many in the Kremlin imagine to have happened. 
The Russians seem to believe that the United States government was able to plan 
and execute a campaign of replacing foreign governments with leaders more friendly to 
the United States. However, anyone with experience working in or with the United States 
government would likely say that the idea of such a well-orchestrated plan requiring a 
large amount of interagency cooperation with a consistent and concerted effort made over 
a period of time spanning almost 15 years is very unlikely. 
This thesis examines the resulting Russian defensive reaction from the perceived 
threat that Russia sees in mass protests and their associated color revolutions.2 It 
examines both the Russian understanding of the threat and the practical steps taken to 
address its vulnerabilities to the threat. It focuses on Russia’s security forces but also 
                                                 
1 Slobodan Milosevic was the president of Serbia and lost the Serbian presidential election in 2000 in 
what is commonly referred to as the Bulldozer Revolution. 
2 The color revolutions, which have also been labeled as electoral revolutions, democratizing elections, 
or mass protest movements, are generally understood to be non-violent protests as a result of perceived 
electoral fraud and are labeled as color revolutions because of the color associated with the political 
opposition. The most well-known color revolutions are the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. However, since this thesis 
will discuss a threat as the Russians perceive it, it will adopt the Russian definition for a color revolution. 
Using the definition General Gerasimov presented at the 2014 Moscow Conference on International 
Security, this thesis will accept that a color revolution is a “a form of non-violent change of power in a 
country by outside manipulation of the protest potential of the population in conjunction with political, 
economic, humanitarian and other non-military measures.” Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and the ‘Color 




briefly discusses how non-military steps have been taken to support those forces as well. 
Overall, it shows that while Russia has certainly reacted to its perception of the color 
revolution threat, this reaction can by no means be taken as driven solely by the threat of 
a color revolution in Russia, or as a specific anti-color revolution strategy that is tightly 
controlled and coordinated by a single entity in the Kremlin. 
 THE THREAT AS RUSSIA SEES IT A.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, a time of transition began as the newly 
created states moved towards more democratic norms. However, while some, like the 
Baltic states, transitioned quickly to liberal democracy, others clung to more autocratic 
forms of governance.3 With considerable funding and support from public and private 
sources in the West, many post-communist countries did away with their long-ruling 
presidents, or in the case of Ukraine, his anointed successor. This was done through 
electoral revolutions in countries such as Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Kyrgyzstan, which have become more popularly known as color revolutions because of 
the colors that became associated with support for the opposition.4 
Leaders in Russia clearly saw these revolutions as a threat to their sphere of 
influence in the former Soviet-dominated region and even to the current governing 
regime in Russia. Russian leaders characterized this threat as a Western attack against the 
sovereignty of nations, one in which Western funds supported opposition groups, youth 
movements, local non-governmental organizations (NGO), and opposition-friendly 
media. However, this concern over Western encroachment into countries traditionally 
located within Russia’s sphere of influence likely increased significantly after the 
electoral protests in Moscow in 2011–2012 and the Arab Spring.5  
                                                 
3 Many terms are used for these types of governments, such as hybrid regimes, mixed governments, 
electoral autocracies, etc. 
4 Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Color Revolutions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); 
Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
5 Graeme Robertson, “Protesting Putinism: The Election Protests of 2011–2012 in Broader 
Perspective,” Problems of Post-Communism 60, no. 2 (2013): 11–23; Hamid Dabashi, The Arab Spring: 
The End of Postcolonialism (London: Zed Books, 2012); George Joffé, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: 
Origins and Prospects,” The Journal of North African Studies 16, no. 4 (2011): 507–32. 
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Comments by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in support of the protests in 
Moscow in 2011 only further “proved” that the West was actively looking to undermine 
Russia and led to Vladimir Putin stating that “[opposition leaders] heard the signal and 
with the support of the U.S. state department began active work.”6 He then said that 
“[w]e all understand the organisers are acting according to a well-known scenario and in 
their own mercenary political interests.”7 After the additional events of the Arab Spring 
and the political turmoil in Ukraine in 2014, Putin said that “[i]n the modern world 
extremism is being used as a geopolitical instrument and for remaking spheres of 
influence. We see what tragic consequences the wave of so-called color revolutions led 
to…For us this is a lesson and a warning. We should do everything necessary so that 
nothing similar ever happens in Russia.”8 
 A MILITARY EMPHASIS ON THE NEW THREAT B.
The threat of a color revolution in Russia was not simply perceived by civilian 
political leaders. In 2011, General Nikolai Makarov, then the Russian Chief of the 
General Staff, believed that some countries were using a combination of methods to get 
rid of unfriendly foreign governments, and he believed that this could be a threat to 
Russia and its allies.9 Fifteen months later, General Makarov’s successor, General 
Valeriy Gerasimov, solidified the concept of this threat in an article in Voenno-
Promyshlenyy Kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier).10 In his article, General Gerasimov 
said that the events of the Arab Spring “confirm that a completely prosperous state can, in 
a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, 
                                                 
6 Miriam Elder, “Vladimir Putin Accuses Hillary Clinton of Encouraging Russian Protests,” The 
Guardian, December 8, 2011, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/08/vladimir-
putin-hillary-clinton-russia. 
7 Elder. 
8 Darya Korsunskaya, “Putin Says Russia Must Prevent ‘Color Revolution,’” Reuters, November 20, 
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-security-idUSKCN0J41J620141120. 
9 Ivan Safronov, “Genshtab gotovitsya k voyne” [General Staff Readies Itself for War], Gazeta 
Kommersant, November 18, 2011, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1818296/. 
10 Valeriy Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii: Novye vyzovy trebuyut perecmyclit’ formy i 
sposoby vedeniya boevykh deystviy” [The Value of Science in Foresight: New Challenges Require 
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Conducting Military Operations], Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er, 
February 27, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. 
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fall prey to foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, 
and civil war.”11 General Gerasimov goes on to discuss how non-military means have 
become more important than military ones in obtaining a state’s political objectives, and 
that the United States, in his opinion, had become very good at integrating these military 
and non-military means in order to quickly develop conditions that have been favorable 
to the United States and decrease any military advantages the target country may have. In 
effect, General Gerasimov is implying that the West, and the United States in particular, 
created the color revolution threat. 
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) showcased its perception of the threat 
when it decided to use the 2014 Moscow Conference on International Security to focus 
on the threat of and response to color revolutions.12 During his opening remarks, Sergei 
Shoygu, Russia’s Minister of Defense, declared color revolutions to be “a major factor in 
the destabilization of the situation in many regions of the world,” and that while the 
methods used in each color revolution are slightly different, they each follow the general 
pattern of “information action — military pressure — a change of political leadership and 
an alteration of the state’s foreign-policy and economic thrust.”13 Following Shoygu, 
Sergei Lavrov discussed the destructive results that occur when Western countries 
unilaterally violate the sovereignty of others under the guise of promoting democracy and 
preventing humanitarian crises; General Gerasimov then described the threat as he had 
laid it out in his article the previous year, elaborating upon specific examples; and next 
the Belarussian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant-General Yuri Zhadobin, discussed the 
regional impacts of color revolutions and the need for regional organizations such as the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to combat them.14 
                                                 
11 Valeriy Gerasimov. 
12 Russian Ministry of Defense, “Conference Proceedings,”(III Moscow Conference on International 
Security, Moscow: Russian Ministry of Defense, 2017, http://eng.mil.ru/files/MCIS_report_
catalogue_final_ENG_21_10_preview.pdf; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and the ‘Color Revolution’: A 
Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the U.S. and the West.” 
13 Russian Ministry of Defense, “Conference Proceedings,” 10. 
14 Russian Ministry of Defense, 12–25. 
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Taken together, these speakers and those who followed showed the level of 
importance Russia puts on this perceived threat. It is not a perception that should be 
ignored and dismissed as unimportant to understanding the motivations of Russian 
actions. One of the conference attendees, Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke 
Chair for Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said of the 
conference that “[w]hat is critical is that the U.S. and Europe listen to what Russian 
military leaders and strategists are saying. These are not Russian views the U.S. and 
Europe can afford to ignore.”15 
 THE IDEA OF A COORDINATED RUSSIAN “STRATEGY” C.
As Edward Meade Earle described it, “[s]trategy is the art of controlling and 
utilizing the resources of a nation…including its armed forces, to the end that its vital 
interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or 
merely presumed.”16 While this thesis will use the word “strategy” in its effort to 
describe Russia’s reaction to a perceived threat, it must be cautioned that this is not 
necessarily meant to imply that each part of Russia’s reaction to the color revolutions is 
part of an overarching strategy being planned in a coordinated manner with a singular 
purpose in mind. Just as Russia mistakenly sees an overarching Western plan where 
democracy assistance is carefully combined with economic pressure and military might 
in order to purposefully carry out coups against anti-Western governments, spectators to 
Russia’s response should not return the favor by assuming Russia acts with unitary focus. 
President Putin may provide guidance and direction for Russia, but it takes thousands of 
bureaucrats and military officers to make this happen, each with their own idea of how 
things should be done and what the priorities for their respective ministry or agency 
should be. 
                                                 
15 Cordesman, “Russia and the ‘Color Revolution’: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized 
by the U.S. and the West,” 3. 
16 Edward Meade Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), viii. 
 6 
There is no reason to think that Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, is acting 
according to a rational actor model.17 The ill fit of the rational actor model for the Soviet 
Union was one of the conclusions that Andrew Marshall and Joseph Loftus reached 
during their work on Project SOVOY, an internal RAND project that sought to improve 
the organization’s ability to predict innovation in the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces. They 
found that the idea of predicting Soviet behavior as if its actions were controlled by a 
single entity was a “mirage,” that its actions could better be analyzed as the result of 
decisions taken by a limited number of people inside a large bureaucracy, and that 
continuing to use the rational actor model to describe Soviet decision-making was 
potentially dangerous.18 The problems with the rational actor model have been examined 
by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, who discussed the use of organizational behavior 
and governmental politics models to better analyze the Soviet Union’s decision-making 
processes.19 Additionally, Morton Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter looked at 
how organizations’ interests and their desire for increased influence in policy decision 
making and execution can alter government decisions, further degrading the idea of a 
single rational actor in the determination of policy decisions.20 
 THE NEED TO UNDERSTAND YOUR ADVERSARY D.
Many in the United States would argue that the color revolution threat as the 
Russians perceive it is not a strategy at all, but simply an example of what Peter Layton 
describes as opportunism, and that the United States is simply reacting to the 
environment abroad, changing and evolving its political and military approach according 
                                                 
17 The rational actor model is a model used to understand governmental decision-making that assumes 
that actions are taken purposefully, that national governments can be analyzed as a singular actor, and that 
each action taken is carefully selected to address a strategic problem. To argue against the use of the 
rational actor model in the analysis of decision-making is to say that the above assumptions are not all 
correct, and this does not imply that a government or actor is acting irrationally. From Graham T. Allison 
and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Longman, 1999), 15. 
18 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping 
of Modern American Defense Strategy, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 45–46. 
19 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision. 
20 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 25–61. 
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to a general principle of supporting democracy.21 As a response to the perceived Western 
strategy of using color revolutions, the Russian strategy may be a form of risk 
management as Layton would describe it, where Russia seeks to build the capabilities to 
protect itself and its allies from the shock of political protests and regime change.22 This 
back and forth action and reaction between the U.S. / NATO and Russia in a contest for 
influence over many of the former communist countries is creating a spiral-like situation 
leading to increasing tension between the two sides and a mistrust of the others’ 
intentions.23 It also seems to fit Shiping Tang’s definition of a security dilemma. 
Shiping Tang defines a security dilemma as a situation where two states act 
defensively toward one another, and because they cannot be certain of the other’s intent, 
seek to accumulate more power and influence in order to defend themselves. However, 
because defensive measures can likely also be used in the offensive, they may be 
perceived as threatening by other side, resulting in each side seeking to take 
countermeasures against the other’s defensive measures. These measures and 
countermeasures, fears and uncertainties, therefore become reinforcing.24 Fully 
understanding the actions and reactions of one’s competitor is likely key to preventing 
further escalation. 
In concluding his 2013 article on modern conflict, General Gerasimov said that no 
matter what new tactics an enemy may use, and no matter how proficient his forces may 
be, there is always a counter to his strategy. He says that every force has its 
vulnerabilities and that there exist the means of frustrating its efforts.25 This was likely 
meant as a call to Russian military leaders to find vulnerabilities in the color revolution 
strategy and to find ways of exploiting them so as to protect Russia and its autocratic 
                                                 
21 Peter Layton, “The Idea of Grand Strategy,” The RUSI Journal 157, no. 4 (August 2012): 59. 
22 Layton, 60. 
23 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 62–67. 
24 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 
594. 
25 Valeriy Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii: Novye vyzovy trebuyut perecmyclit’ formy i 
sposoby vedeniya boevykh deystviy” [The Value of Science in Foresight: New Challenges Require 
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Conducting Military Operations].” 
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allies. It may also have been a call to learn from what the United States had done in order 
to use these non-military methods as offensive tools to expand Russian influence and 
undermine its Western competitors.  
While Russia’s offensive efforts receive the majority of the attention and research, 
its defensive efforts are important as well if the United States wants to continue to 
promote more liberal democracies and pro-Western regimes, especially in former 
communist states. This understanding of Russia’s defensive reaction needs to include not 
only how the Russian security forces are adapting but also why they are adapting in those 
ways. The Russians are developing new methods to push back against this wave of 
democratization both at home and abroad, some of which were seen in Kyrgyzstan and 
Ukraine in 2010.26 It is critical for the United States and the West to understand these 
methods if they wish to continue to adapt and attempt to stay ahead of the Russians in 
this strategic evolution. 
Some of this work has already been accomplished. Gerasimov’s views of the 
changing nature of war have been thoroughly analyzed.27 Others have discussed the 
importance of Gerasimov’s ideas regarding whether or not this constitutes a new doctrine 
or method of war for Russia.28 These more generic articles have been followed up with 
countless articles specifically discussing Russia’s actions in this regard in Ukraine and 
Syria. However, much of this work focuses on Russia’s offensive capabilities, i.e., its 
ability to usurp this Western doctrine for its own means, and less has been written on 
                                                 
26 Philip P. Pan, “Russia Is Said to Have Fueled Unrest in Kyrgyzstan,” Washington Post, April 12, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/11/AR2010041103827.html; Taras 
Kuzio, “Russia Backs Yanukovych in Ukraine’s 2010 Elections,” Jamestown Foundation, January 29, 
2010, https://jamestown.org/program/russia-backs-yanukovych-in-ukraines-2010-elections/. 
27 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows 
(blog), July 6, 2014, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-
russian-non-linear-war/; Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (2016): 
30–38. 
28 Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 
2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/; Roger N. 
McDermott, “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (2016): 97; Ruslan Pukhov, 
“Mif o ‘gibridnoy voyne’” [The Myth of Hybrid War], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, May 25, 2015, 
http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html; Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Indirect and Asymmetric 
Methods as a Response to the New Western Way of War,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 1 (2016): 1–
11. 
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Russia’s reaction to this new “Western way of war” in order to protect the status quo and 
Russian interests in its near abroad.  
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY E.
This thesis examines the Russian security forces’ adaptation to a changing 
security environment. More specifically, it examines how the Russians are reacting to 
defend against the threat environment that General Gerasimov has identified. It does so 
by utilizing questions proposed in “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” which 
looks at the issue of military effectiveness by asking questions related to the generation of 
military power at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels.29 This thesis 
examines the strategic level, defined as the use of military or forceful means to achieve 
national goals as they are defined by the state’s political leaders,30 and the operational 
level, which is the planning and development of methods and supporting doctrine to 
enable the employment of security forces in order to achieve a state’s strategic 
objectives.31 
One section for each of four aspects is used to examine Russia’s defensive 
reaction to the color revolutions. Each section addresses why that specific question is 
relevant to this discussion and its importance in defending against the color revolution 
threat, lays out the steps Russia has taken to respond to the corresponding element of the 
threat, and evaluates how successful that response has been. These four aspects were 
chosen in order to thoroughly cover the breadth of any reaction, or lack of reaction, to the 
threat and to best answer the question of how Russia has innovated in response to the 
color revolutions.  
The first section discusses the Russian military’s understanding of the threat, 
examining what elements make up a color revolution and what are the possible defenses 
needed in response. The second section discusses the major steps that Russia’s security 
                                                 
29 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military 
Organizations,” International Security 11, no. 1 (1986): 37–71. 
30 Millett, Murray, and Watman, 42. 
31 Millett, Murray, and Watman, 50. 
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forces have taken to more adequately respond to the threat and coordinate the 
government’s efforts. The third section discusses the steps taken by the Russian 
government to support its security forces in defending against the political opposition and 
mass protests that generally represent the culmination of a color revolution. A fourth 
section addresses Russian efforts to establish a forward line of defense against color 
revolutions by supporting its autocratic allies in the region. 
Taken together, these sections show how Russia has developed a reasonable 
understanding of the threat, but it is an understanding that overestimates the intent of the 
U.S. government to conduct regime changes and the role of Western democratization 
efforts in color revolution successes. These sections also show how Russia is working to 
insulate itself from the Western influences that helped to set the conditions for the color 
revolution successes. However, the Kremlin continues to place a higher emphasis on the 
threat than does the Russian MOD, which is evident in the more robust reaction to the 
color revolutions that is seen coming from the Kremlin. 
Lastly, this thesis addresses what implications this research has for the United 
States and NATO strategy in Europe and what additional questions need to be answered 
concerning Russia’s response to the color revolutions. While understanding Russia’s 
offensive reaction to the Western “strategy” of conducting color revolutions is certainly 
important, its defensive reaction has something to tell us as well.   
 11 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
In 1974, Soviet General V.K. Konoplev said that the driving force and motivation 
for foresight are practical application and experience, where foresight is the ability to 
understand possible innovations in military affairs and the determination of how such 
innovations can be used in conflict.32 It is also a skill that General Gerasimov, the Chief 
of the Russian General Staff, apparently finds lacking in Russia’s military science 
community. In a 2016 article, General Gerasimov criticized his peers for having lost the 
ability to recognize and rigorously study contemporary military problems as they emerge, 
and the following year, he once again called for the Academy of Military Sciences to 
participate in the discussion concerning the changing nature of war, in which conflicts 
develop at a more rapid pace and that predominantly use non-military means.33 This call 
for improved foresight in modern conflict may be due to the perception that Russia’s 
military has been intellectually behind in the color revolution “arms race.” While General 
Gerasimov described the perceived color revolution threat in 2013, it has been 
developing since the mid-1990s. The early stages were seen in Romania and Bulgaria in 
1996 and 1997, respectively. Its successful elements coalesced into a somewhat 
organized strategy in Slovakia in 1998 and in Croatia in early 2000. Then, the mass 
protests in Serbia after the presidential election in 2000 represented the culmination of 
the electoral strategy’s evolution as a method for conducting a color revolution.34 The 
                                                 
32 Jacob W. Kipp, “The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in Soviet Military Affairs” (Ft. 
Leavenworth: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Soviet Army Studies Office, 1987), 10, 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA196677. 
33 Valeriy Gerasimov, “Po opytu Sirii” [According to the Syrian Experience], Voenno-Promyshlennyy 
Kur’er, March 9, 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/29579; Valeriy Gerasimov, “Mir na granyakh voyny” 
[The World on the Edge of War], Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er, March 15, 2017, http://vpk-news.ru/
articles/35591. 
34 The electoral strategy is one that combines the efforts of foreign support, domestic civil society, 
youth movements, and a unified political opposition to increase voter turn-out, expose electoral fraud, and 
if necessary, non-violently protest against “stolen” elections in order to remove an incumbent government 
from power. From Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. 
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Russian government has responded to the threat with some non-military means, but the 
military largely remained silent on the topic until the efforts of General Gerasimov.35 
There are multiple reasons that can explain why Russian military scholars were 
delayed in their response to color revolutions. It could be because the threat was not taken 
seriously until the Arab Spring and the electoral protests in Moscow, both of which were 
ongoing in the winter of 2011–2012, bringing the perception of the threat back into the 
forefront of people’s minds. It could simply be because of the change of leadership at the 
MOD from Serdyukov and Makarov to Shoygu and Gerasimov. Also, it could have been 
because President Putin finally put enough pressure on the military to address a threat 
that could personally target his ability to retain power. Additionally, the response may 
have been delayed because it is not easy for any large military organization to change its 
thinking, and the delayed response could be a result of organizational inertia and a 
Russian military culture that has created friction against responding to such a non-
traditional threat.  
This chapter examines how Russians perceive the color revolution threat. It does 
so by first examining two sources of resistance to change that all large military 
organizations face: organizational resistance and cultural resistance. It then looks at the 
Russian understanding of the threat by first examining the Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation and then examining the discussion of the color revolution threat that 
has been published in Russian military journals, amongst other sources. Next, it looks at 
some of the suggested defenses and proposed changes needed to protect Russia from the 
color revolution threat, and finally, it looks at what Russia’s understanding of the threat 
means for its likelihood to respond appropriately. 
 SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO CHANGE  A.
Although it may take some time, militaries do tend to innovate when faced with 
new threats and in response to their own past failures, and they also tend to innovate in 
                                                 
35 Katherine T. Hinkle, “Russia’s Reactions to the Color Revolutions” (Naval Postgraduate School, 
2017), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/52991/17Mar_Hinkle_Katherine.pdf?sequence=1. 
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response to the experiences of their client states as well.36 For Russia, these experiences 
include not only the failures of regimes in Serbia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, but also the 
successes of regimes in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Syria. These case studies give 
the Russian military the opportunity to learn not only from their allies’ experiences, but 
their own as well. 
However, the color revolution threat alone may not be enough to encourage 
military innovation. Successful innovation likely requires not only the imagination and 
vision of senior leaders, but also a supportive organizational and military culture.37 
General Gerasimov appears to be providing the vision and emphasis for this effort from 
the senior leadership, but military organizational and cultural resistance to any changes 
are common obstacles preventing innovation from the status quo, and are sources of 
resistance that will need to be overcome if Russia is to protect against the perceived 
threat of a color revolution.38 
1. Organizational Resistance to Change 
Organizational resistance to change, perhaps better described as a bureaucratic 
resistance to change, is something all large militaries must struggle against in order to 
innovate in response to changing threats and conditions, and there is no reason to think 
that the large bureaucracy in the MOD would be any different. Bureaucracies work to 
create order out of a constantly changing world and will act as a brake against changes 
that upset the current status quo.39 
Because of the large size of the MOD and the large bureaucracy that it takes to 
run the ministry, it should not be surprising that Russia’s military has taken so long and 
                                                 
36 Janine Davidson, “Military Learning and Competing Theories of Change,” in Lifting the Fog of 
Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
2010), 10; Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military 
Innovation, 1955–1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 178. 
37 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 4. 
38 Davidson, “Military Learning and Competing Theories of Change,” 11. 
39 Williamson Murray, “Military Adaptation in War” (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense 
Analyses, June 2009), 20, http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA509781. 
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perhaps been resistant to any substantial changes that might help it confront a non-
traditional threat. In general, leaders and the bureaucracies that support them see an 
inherent risk in any innovation, and their “organizations abhor uncertainly, and changes 
in traditional patterns always involve uncertainty.”40 Innovations will be unproven and 
may come at the expense of methods and force structures that have proven themselves to 
be successful in the past. These proven methods and force structures, and the decisions 
that leaders made in the past that led to success, continue to be reinforced, influencing the 
type of war that a nation will be prepared to fight next. Even when leaders are presented 
with evidence that future wars will not be as anticipated, they will be hesitant to deviate 
from the path already established.41 
Risk averse senior officers, who generally wish to simply maintain the status quo, 
are reluctant to contemplate and prepare to fight in ways for which their own education 
and experience have not prepared them. These leaders, who attained their rank under the 
current system by mastering the current doctrine against largely traditionally-defined 
threats, are understandably hesitant to create a new doctrine based on a new threat and 
thereby make their own experience and knowledge less relevant.42 General Gerasimov 
appears willing to push for the changes necessary to fight in modern conflicts. This 
includes embracing non-traditional methods of conflict and non-military forms of power, 
and while some senior leaders are resistant to change, others attempt to walk the line 
between the reformists and traditionalists.43  
However, Russia’s military culture may be the sticking point that prevents true 
change. While organizational resistance works as a brake against any quick changes to 
the status quo, military culture resists changes from the traditional character of a military 
and those that take the organization away from the force structures and lessons learned 
                                                 
40 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 3rd ed., Cornell Studies in Security Affairs 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 224. 
41 Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change, 6. 
42 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 224. 
43 Makhmut Gareyev, “Vyzov prinyat” [Challenge Accepted], Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur’er, 
December 24, 2016, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/29347; Makhmut Gareyev, “Posledovatel’no 
otstaivat’ natsional’nye interesy” [Consistently Defending National Interests], Voenno-Promyshlennyy 
Kur’er, January 22, 2014, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/18828. 
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from the last “good” war.44 If the innovations needed to counter the color revolution 
threat deviate from the military’s traditional role and the image of the last “good” war, 
which in Russia is World War II, they are more likely to be rejected. 
2. Cultural Resistance to Change 
Military culture is the “set of beliefs, attitudes, and values within the military 
establishment that shape collective (shared) preferences of how and when military means 
should be used to accomplish strategic aim.”45 As Lieutenant General Stroup put it, “the 
Army’s culture is its personality. It reflects the Army’s values, philosophy, norms and 
unwritten rules…[which] guide behavior and the way the Army processes information as 
an organization.”46 It stands to reason that Russia’s military culture will impact the way 
in which its senior theorists think about the color revolution threat and how to respond, 
especially since defeating this threat is not and should not be a core mission of Russia’s 
military. However, as a peripheral mission, even if emphasized by senior leaders, it 
stands the chance of being politely ignored if it deviates from Russian military culture or 
detracts from what is seen as the military’s core mission.47  
Russia’s military culture, like all others, is a legacy of its past, and it is not one 
that lends itself to countering the color revolution threat. Military cultures are rooted in 
military successes, and militaries tend to hold onto what worked in the past and reject 
what has not.48 For Russia, its greatest historic success was World War II, or as the 
Russians call it, the Great Patriotic War. The perception that World War II was perhaps 
Russia’s last good war helps to explain why Russia continues to prioritize massive 
numbers of tanks and artillery and still emphasizes a mobilization military. It is also an 
explanatory factor for why Russia’s defeat in Afghanistan and its struggles in Chechnya 
                                                 
44 Davidson, “Military Learning and Competing Theories of Change,” 13. 
45 Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and 
Irregular War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 40. 
46 Theodore G. Stroup, “Leadership and Organizational Culture: Actions Speak Louder than Words,” 
Military Review 76 (1996): 45. 
47 Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War, 40. 
48 Cassidy, 40. 
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against asymmetric threats, both of which might be deemed “bad” wars, never led to 
Russia developing a significant light infantry capability, which would be more useful 
than armored forces in future conflicts of a similar nature.49 Russia’s military culture is 
one that embraces the idea of quantity over quality, and it is one that has a relatively high 
tolerance for human casualties.50 However, a large armored force that isn’t especially 
concerned with reducing the possible number of casualties is one that is not best suited 
for countering the color revolution threat.  
In the United States, it took the pressing demand of fighting counterinsurgencies 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan to briefly break from a Cold War mentality of 
conventionally-defined war based upon the use of army divisions as the standard fighting 
unit to one that prioritized the use of self-sufficient brigade combat teams and special 
operations forces with an emphasis on fighting asymmetric and irregular threats. 
However, with those wars largely over, the United States military’s cultural attraction to 
fighting the force-on-force symmetric fight is returning.  
This cultural pull is something with which the Russian military must also contend. 
Russia’s military culture affects how they think about the threat, and it could restrict what 
the military sees as acceptable reactions to the threat. While this cultural aversion to non-
traditional war may have helped to delay an intellectual response from Russian military 
thinkers, it has not ultimately stopped that response all together. 
 THE COLOR REVOLUTION DISCUSSION THUS, FAR B.
The color revolution discussion was not completely absent from public discourse 
in Russia prior to 2013. The color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan could 
hardly be ignored, but the emphasis of it as a threat to Russia did seem to be missing. The 
re-emphasis of the threat after 2012, however, led to a large amount of writing on the 
topic in military journals and newspapers, and the color revolution threat played a large 
part in the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 
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1. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
In December 2014, President Putin signed the most recent Military Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation.51 This document, while referred to as a “military doctrine,” is 
more akin to a national military strategy. The 2014 doctrine includes a section on the 
nature and characteristics of modern warfare, lists the main dangers and threats that 
Russia faces, and also lists some of the tasks that Russia must accomplish in order to 
prevent and contain armed conflict. 
The 2014 doctrine’s discussion on the characteristics of modern warfare reads like 
a summary of what General Gerasimov has discussed at length. Pertinent to this 
discussion, several of these elements seem to specifically refer to the color revolution 
threat. The elements mentioned include the use of non-military means combined with the 
protest potential of the local population, the use of irregular military forces and private 
military companies, and the use of externally funded and organized political groups and 
social movements. These elements are essentially what Russia accuses the West of doing 
in order to create color revolutions.52 
The perceived threat of a Russian color revolution is not just affecting how 
Russians perceive modern warfare, but has also caused them to re-evaluate directions 
from which threats might come. While internal dangers have been considered in the past, 
the 2014 doctrine greatly expanded upon the concept of domestic military dangers. These 
internal dangers include organizations and people who act to undermine Russia’s 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, or those activities that create ethnic and social 
tension: a description that can easily be applied to any group of economic or political 
protesters. Additionally, the doctrine sees as a danger the use of information to influence 
the Russian people, especially its youth, to turn away from their traditional, spiritual, and 
patriotic feelings of support to defend the Fatherland. Lastly, the doctrine points to the 
danger of activities that aim to violently change Russia’s constitutional system and that 
                                                 
51 “Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii” [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], 
December 26, 2014, http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf. 
52 “Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii” [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], 7–8. 
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destabilize the country’s political and social system.53 Such a violent change to a 
constitutional system is essentially how Russians describe the Euromaidan protests in 
2013 in Ukraine, calling them an anti-constitutional coup. 
Even the external dangers described in the 2014 doctrine were not devoid of 
references to the non-traditional threats associated with a color revolution. Among these 
dangers are the use of information technology to undermine Russia’s sovereignty and 
political stability, the overthrow of legitimate governments in states bordering Russia, 
and the subversive activities of foreign governments’ intelligence services.54 The 
combination of these internal and external dangers appears to paint the picture of a 
Kremlin that is even more paranoid about internal instability, social unrest, and the ability 
of the West to influence Russian society and political culture. 
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation provides one source of formal 
doctrine, but to have an impact upon military operations, both formal and informal 
doctrine are likely to be necessary, where informal doctrine includes journal articles and 
other unofficial publications, letters, correspondence, and speeches. These pieces of 
informal doctrine, published by Russian senior military leaders and strategists, are an 
important source of information and complement the perception of the color revolution 
threat found in Russia’s 2014 military doctrine. 
2. Russia’s Informal Military Doctrine 
Even though discussions of color revolutions in Russian publications appeared 
before 2013, General Gerasimov largely began this discussion of color revolutions and 
the process of creating informal doctrine with respect to color revolutions in his 2013 
article. He and others have published their thoughts as they relate to this threat in Russian 
military journals such as Voenno-Promyshlenyy Kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier), 
Voennaya Misl (Military Thought), and Armeiskiy Sbornik (Army Collection), amongst 
others, and this thesis primarily uses the work published in these sources in order to 
understand current Russian thinking on the topic. However, while some of these articles 
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do discuss color revolutions and their constituent elements as a separate topic, they are 
frequently analyzed as one part of the overall Western way of war, an element of hybrid 
or new-generation warfare, or simply as an evolution and new phase of the Cold War. 
However, one defines the threat, whether it is or isn’t a part of hybrid warfare, for 
example, is largely irrelevant to this discussion. What is important to the Russian 
understanding of color revolutions is what their constituent elements are and how Russia 
can better defend against them. 
A.N. Belsky and O.V. Klimenko’s article, “The Political Engineering of Color 
Revolutions,” is a good starting place in a search to understand the Russian view of this 
topic. Belsky and Klimenko cite previous work to understand the typology of color 
revolutions (if such a thing could actually exist) and point to Dr. Gene Sharp’s From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation as the underlying 
practical guide to the color revolutions.55 Dr. Sharp’s work was in fact used by Western 
democracy promoters, especially in Serbia, and in Ukraine during the 2004 Orange 
Revolution, to educate those opposed to the incumbent government on non-violent 
methods of political opposition.56 
Aleksandr Bartosh’s piece, “Color Revolutions and the Hybrid Wars of the 
Present,” while written from the viewpoint of a Russia consistently under attack from the 
West, does lay out rather accurately the progression of events during what are 
traditionally thought of as the color revolutions, the electoral revolutions of the early 
2000s. It starts with the creation of an organized political opposition, and then uses a 
catalyst to encourage public outrage, which in the past has included things such as 
perceived electoral fraud, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, or the violent 
overreaction of security forces against protesters.57 Finally, massive political protests are 
                                                 
55 A.N. Belsky and O.V. Klimenko, “Politicheskie tekhnologii ‘tsvetnykh revolyutsiy’: puti i 
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57 Mohamed Bouazizi was a Tunisian street vendor who lit himself on fire in protest after harassment 
by government officials and the confiscation of his street cart and wares. His self-immolation sparked the 
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used to demand and gain political concessions from the government.58 This description of 
the progression of events is similar to what General Gerasimov described in his article in 
2013, although General Gerasimov’s description describes a much more generalized 
conflict scenario.  
When it comes to the specific elements and characteristics of a color revolution, 
Colonel Kalistratov’s discussion in Armeiskiy Sbornik about the various types of modern 
war hits many of the key aspects. Among the aspects that are relevant to a color 
revolution are the pre-eminence of non-military means over military ones; a split among 
the country’s political and military elites, which undermines the government’s ability to 
maintain its aura of strength and influence, and subsequently, weakens its control over 
security forces; a long-term effort to change the populace’s perception of the appropriate 
social contract between a country’s government and its citizens; a long-term change to a 
country’s basic principles and values; a decentralized and indirect link between the 
internal opposition and the external actors supporting them; and the use of an ideological 
cover, such as democratization and human rights, to justify external intervention.59 
The elements mentioned by Bartosh and Kalistratov are frequently mentioned in 
other articles discussing color revolutions and modern warfare, but many other aspects 
that frequently, but not always, appear as a part of a color revolution are important to 
understand as well. As many note, opposition groups and non-governmental 
organizations involved in color revolutions frequently receive funding and training at 
least in part by foreign organizations and governments.60  
Additionally, many authors note the role that young people and modern 
communication technologies play in color revolutions. This observation about young 
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people should not be surprising, since young people are frequently among the voices 
demanding change in countries the world over, and youth organizations and young 
people in general did play a significant role in several of the color revolutions. This is 
especially the case in Serbia, where the student movement, Otpor, meaning resistance, 
was among the leading opposition groups.61 Likewise, Pora, a Ukrainian youth group, 
played a large role in the Orange Revolution, especially in the organization of protests in 
Kiev.62 The role of youth has not been overlooked in color revolution discussions, 
especially the perception that young people are being negatively influenced from 
abroad.63 
Colonel Kalistratov claims that color revolutions were not successful until the 
advent of cellphones, the Internet, and mass media. This is not exactly true, since 
revolutions long before any of those things existed fit the definition of a color revolution. 
However, modern communication technologies have certainly made the diffusion of 
ideas and the spread of non-violent methods and tactics much easier, and they have 
decreased government’s ability to control the flow of such ideas. These modern 
technologies, and the influence pushed by the West through them, are frequently cited as 
a reason for the change in culture, morals, and values of Russia’s youth, which 
supposedly leads to lowered support for the government and the growth of activism and 
extremism.64 
3. Color Revolution Defenses 
The non-violent nature of color revolutions and the non-military methods used to 
conduct them largely necessitate non-military defenses against them. Some of these non-
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military defenses that those writing about the threat have identified include countering 
foreign media and information globalization, isolating opposition leaders and groups and 
cutting them off from any foreign financing and media support, and strengthening the 
patriotic values and will of Russia’s youth to support the state against political 
oppositions.65 
These defensive measures may not require military involvement, but others might, 
and some definitely do. Colonel Kalistratov, for example, called for the quick 
introduction of martial law, the use of wartime laws during an internal crisis, and the 
quick suppression of mass disorder and protests, all of which might require military 
involvement. However, if such a major crisis should break out that the military does need 
to get involved, government coordination of the response will be complicated. 
General Gerasimov on several occasions has spoken about the need for a more 
well-defined understanding of each ministry’s role in national defense and in the use of 
joint forces in a crisis.66 This includes the need to develop a more defined method for 
employing and controlling military and non-military forces deployed within Russia 
during a crisis. While many believe that the military isn’t needed to defend against such 
an internal crisis as a color revolution in Russia, and therefore, controlling them inside 
the country is irrelevant, General Gerasimov disagrees.67 
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General Makhmut Gareyev, the president of the Russian Academy of Military 
Sciences, also noticed this capability gap as early as 2013 and began calling for a single 
command post to unify Russian military and non-military efforts.68 He would also like to 
see the Russian Security Council become responsible for defending the country from 
non-military as well as military threats, and since color revolutions generally fall below 
the defined definition of war, he would like to see the Minister of Defense be given the 
rights of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces even in 
peacetime in order to better control these military forces.69 
Recently, General Gerasimov has used the events in the Middle East as an 
example of the country’s need to actively defend its interests abroad in order to help deter 
future color revolutions. In order to help deter color revolutions, says General Gerasimov, 
Russia needs allies and must maintain and even expand its international presence in 
regions where it has vital interests. This could mean creating new military bases abroad, 
but it also means strengthening Russia’s ties with the countries of the CSTO and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The diffusion of ideas and the spread of color 
revolutions, during the Arab Spring for example, does highlight why Russia needs a 
forward defense against the problem, something that General Gerasimov and others have 
apparently noticed. 
  A DELAYED RESPONSE TO COLOR REVOLUTIONS C.
The rise of the color revolution phenomenon in the early 2000s should have been 
recognized by Russia’s military leadership as a threat, and to some degree, it was. 
However, the Russian military never suffered a defeat or failure at the hands of a color 
revolution. Those defeats, such as in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, were 
suffered by Russia’s allies, and this lack of a defeat may help to explain the Russian 
military’s delayed response to the color revolution threat. Colonel General Leonid 
Ivashov said that, “[i]n Russia, unfortunately, no one has seriously studied this matter 
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until recently, or commissioned any scientific research reports, or appointed a leading 
organization to be responsible for preventing such kinds of revolutions and wars.” Had 
such a study been conducted a decade ago, he said, the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in 
2014 may have ended differently.70 
As General Gerasimov notes, the Russian military certainly should capture all the 
lessons possible from its experiences in Syria. However, when it comes to the color 
revolution threat, the Russians must prevent their military cultural bias from influencing 
how to interpret these lessons learned. Russia entered the conflict in Syria long after the 
non-violent protests had ended, and while many in Russia claim that the conflict fits their 
definition of a color revolution, by the time Russia got involved militarily, the conflict 
had become a civil war. Most of the lessons Russia will learn are those of a modern, 
conventional war: air-ground integration, the use of cruise missiles, operational logistics, 
urban combat, etc. Using these lessons as an example of how to combat the color 
revolution threat may fit nicely within Russia’s existing military capabilities and military 
culture, but they would not serve to help the Russian military against massive political 
protests and other non-military and non-violent means of opposition.  
The obstacles to innovation make it seem more likely for the Russian military to 
make the threat response fit its existing capabilities than modify its capabilities to meet 
the threat. However, in the unlikely event that such a conflict should take place in 
Belarus, for example, Russia’s tactics in Syria and the lessons it learns may not be 
appropriate. Mass political protests in Belarus cannot be solved by Russian jets dropping 
bombs and Russian tanks rolling down the streets of Minsk, and when the only tool you 
have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. 
Even if the Russian military learns the right lessons, it may get in its own way and 
obstruct any necessary reforms required by its newly acquired knowledge. While Russia, 
and the Soviet Union before it, has historically focused on foresight, recognizing the 
changes to war, and coming up with new ideas, it is not very good at implementing those 
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ideas.71 The Russians are generally the first to recognize changes to military conflict, and 
in the past, have been very good about developing new military concepts, something that 
Dima Adamsky feels should be considered as a part of Russia’s strategic military culture. 
However, “[t]he bearers of Russian-Soviet strategic culture were traditionally good at 
theorizing about innovative concepts but pathologically bad at executing them.”72  
In addition to the organizational and cultural obstacles to Russian military 
innovation, there is also the question of how much of a threat color revolutions really 
present to Russia in the eyes of the military. General Gareyev generally agrees that 
subversion and color revolutions are a threat to Russia, but he says they are lesser threats, 
and that updating Russia’s nuclear arsenal and maintaining its large tank and artillery-
based formations must remain as the top priorities to defend Russia.73 To him, the color 
revolution threat is better addressed by countering the West’s distortion of Russia’s 
values and standards, unifying the Russian people, creating a strong bond between the 
“patriotic youth” and the army, and encouraging a society that strongly supports the idea 
of defending the Fatherland.74 The color revolution threat alone is likely not serious 
enough to warrant large-scale innovation in the military, and the peripheral focus that it 
receives in comparison to traditional threats is likely warranted, meaning responding to 
the color revolution threat will remain of secondary importance. This could be a problem 
since the military has historically been called upon to help deal with protesters, and 
because some in the Kremlin, who may feel that their control on power is the target of 
any color revolution, believe the threat to be much greater. This mismatch of priorities is 
likely one cause for the difference in responses between the military and the internal 
security forces, as the next chapter will discuss. 
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III. REACTION TO COLOR REVOLUTIONS 
Authoritarian regimes must walk a careful line in the suppression of the 
opposition. As an opposition grows, regimes may be tempted to use more coercive and 
violent actions to end such growth. However, while letting an opposition movement 
grow presents risks to the incumbent regime’s survival, any use of violence on the part 
of the regime comes with risks of its own. While incumbent regimes may deem small 
amounts of violence as necessary in order to maintain its control of power, outright 
violent repression tends to undercut support for the regime, as seen in Slovakia in 1998, 
Serbia in 2000, and Ukraine in 2004.75 In Serbia, this repression was interpreted as 
desperation on the part of the regime, which emboldened the opposition, and in 
Ukraine, the public deemed the regime’s murder and poisoning of a journalist and an 
opposition leader as a step too far in its escalation of violent repression.76 
On the pathway to regime survival, the state’s security forces can go too far to 
protect the regime, but they can also not go far enough. While there are numerous 
factors, both domestic and international, that lead to the downfall of an autocratic 
regime, in the end, authoritarian leaders are defeated by color revolutions due to a 
failure of their security services.77 In Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine (in 2004), Tunisia, and 
Egypt, the police and/or army refused to act in defense of the incumbent, and in 
Ukraine (in 2014) and Libya, they lacked the ability to do so. The need to temper the 
amount of violence used when dealing with “peaceful” protesters in order to not inspire 
greater opposition, but at the same time have the will and ability to act in the regime’s 
defense, calls for a professional and well-trained security force that is loyal to the 
current national leadership. 
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This is a problem with which Russia is very familiar and that helped to bring 
about the downfall of the previous two regimes. In February 1917, largely economic 
grievances stemming from the ongoing losing war and food shortages led to massive 
protests in Petrograd. However, when an army regiment attempted to disperse the 
crowds, it ended up killing many of the protesters and sparking outrage among the 
populace. As a result, half of the city’s 160,000-man garrison mutinied, with the other 
half remaining neutral in the conflict between the government and populace, and the 
military and police commands in the city were unable to stop the violence.78 The 
inability of the authorities in Petrograd to regain control ultimately led to the end of 
Russia’s tsarist regime. 
The death of the Soviet Union likewise saw a combination of the unwillingness 
to act and a violent overreaction to growing opposition and nationalist movements. For 
example, the Kremlin’s willingness to back down and accede the demands of protesters 
in Kazakhstan in 1986 boosted other nationalist movements in the Soviet Union.79 Two 
years later, an inability to prevent clashes between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis and 
the resulting protests again showed Soviet weakness.80  
These failures to act were followed by overreactions on the part of the Soviet 
Union’s security forces. In April 1989, the military killed 21 people and wounded 200 
in its attempt to end protests in Tbilisi. The following January, 131 people were 
reportedly killed and another 744 were wounded when Soviet troops moved to retake 
Baku from nationalistic protesters. Then, 14 people were killed and 580 were wounded 
in attempts to suppress protests in Vilnius in January 1991.81 
The security forces’ final two failures ultimately led to the end of the 
Communist regime. In March 1991, the Communists attempted to impeach Yeltsin, but 
Yeltsin escaped impeachment with the help of several hundred thousand protesters in 
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Moscow. These Muscovites protested even in the face of Gorbachev’s ban on protests 
and the threat of force from fifty thousand soldiers.82 Lastly, in August 1991, the 
refusal of the army and KGB to follow government orders during the attempted coup 
showed that “the Right had no force, and so permitted the Left to rush forward in 
revolutionary fashion to destroy the old order.”83 The current government in Moscow 
must feel pressure to ensure its security forces do not fail like they have in the past, and 
is likely nervous about the possibility of large opposition protests associated with the 
upcoming 2018 presidential election, not to mention what may occur in 2024 when 
President Putin will again be unable to run for election without a change to the 
constitution.84  
This section discusses the two most significant steps undertaken by Russia’s 
security forces in recent years to combat the threat of a color revolution. The first is the 
creation of the Russian National Guard in 2016, which consolidated all of the forces 
needed to combat internal instability and disorder into one government entity. The 
second is the military’s creation of the National Defense Management Center (NDMC), 
which helps to improve inter-ministry cooperation and link Russia’s internal and 
external forces for use both within Russia and abroad. While both are significant, these 
two steps highlight the difference in priority given to the color revolution threat, 
because while the creation of the National Guard seems mainly to be a response to the 
color revolution threat, the NDMC is likely a response more closely related to the 
quicker pace of modern conflict and the need for inter-ministry cooperation abroad, as 
General Gerasimov has so frequently discussed.  
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 THE ROSGVARDIYA: CREATING A MORE RELIABLE COERCIVE A.
FORCE 
It is not surprising that many in the military community believe that Russia’s 
true threats lay outside its borders, but General Yuri Baluyevsky, the former chief of 
Russia’s General Staff, disagrees. He believes that Russia cannot be defeated from 
outside, but only from inside, and that Russia must be prepared to defend itself from 
these internal threats.85 One of the more recent and most consequential steps taken to 
combat the problems of the past and to address internal threats to Russia is the creation 
of Russia’s National Guard, the Rosgvardiya, which is estimated to have somewhere 
between 340 and 400 thousand personnel.86 President Putin officially created the 
organization on July 3, 2016 when he signed the law “On the National Guard Forces of 
the Russian Federation.”87 
Russia’s National Guard has assumed a large amount of the security 
responsibilities inside Russia, and is now tasked to enforce order during emergency 
situations, combat terrorism and extremism, protect Russia’s territorial integrity, protect 
specially designated sites and infrastructure, enforce domestic arms control, escort 
special cargo, and work with the police to safeguard public order, which would include 
controlling and / or dispersing mass protests.88 These responsibilities include the 
authority to detain people for several hours, which will be useful when breaking up 
protests. General Baluyevsky, who now advises the National Guard’s commander, said 
that these “activities are aimed at protecting citizens, protecting public order and public 
security, ultimately—avoiding a color revolution.”89 
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While the National Guard will not have the investigative capabilities of the 
police, it will have an intelligence capability. An intelligence capability without 
investigative authority seems an unlikely combination for pursuing terrorists, but it will 
be useful in predicting when and where protests, rallies, and riots will take place and 
how large they may be.90 Supporting this intelligence effort, the National Guard is 
building the capability to actively monitor social networks.91 If the National Guard is 
better able to pre-empt large-scale gatherings, their job of controlling and / or 
dispersing such gatherings will be all the easier with less risk of bloodshed. 
In its creation, the National Guard took a large amount of responsibility from 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and it also took around 160,000 personnel from 
the organization. This number includes 5,200 personnel from the MVD’s Special Rapid 
Response Team (SOBR) units along with OMON and its 40,000 personnel.92 In 
addition to personnel and responsibilities formerly controlled by the MVD, the National 
Guard has replaced the Federal Drug Control Service and the Federal Migration 
Service, has gained control of the Okhrana, which manages security for select 
companies and individuals, and also now controls Chechnya’s security service, the 
“Kadyrovtsy.”93  
The National Guard will primarily be used as a force inside Russia where it can 
be used by President Putin “as insurance against the development of a color revolution 
in Russia.”94 However, it can also be used outside of Russia in conjunction with the 
CSTO.95 Its forces now include units that have already been a part of the CSTO’s 
Collective Rapid Reaction Force in the past, and its new forces may have the training 
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and experience to better handle issues of public disorder abroad as compared to the 
capabilities that the MOD can provide.96  
The National Guard does appear to increase the capabilities of the Russian 
government to respond to mass protests in both Russia and abroad, and it also gives 
President Putin more direct control over that capability. The National Guard’s 
commander, Colonel-General Viktor Zolotov, is a longtime associate of the president. 
He commanded the government’s bodyguards from 2000–2013, and then became the 
First Deputy Minister of the Interior until his appointment to the National Guard. With 
the trusted Zolotov reporting directly to the president, this gives President Putin tight 
control of the forces necessary to respond to any internal threat to Russia and the 
continuation of the Putin regime, allowing Putin to safeguard himself from such 
threats.97 
Recently, this chain of command has been strengthened when responding to 
internal threats. While government agencies are subordinated to the military when 
facing an external threat, as of May 2017, the military can now be placed under the 
command of the National Guard when facing an internal one.98 Placing other ministries 
under the direction of the MOD is not unheard of in Russia, but making elements of the 
MOD subservient to another ministry is new. This only serves to strengthen President 
Putin’s grip on the chain of command and may lower the chances of units not obeying 
orders when called upon to suppress mass protests during a crisis, emergency situation, 
or attempted color revolution. 
The National Guard has wasted no time in the assumption of its duties. Quickly 
after its creation, the National Guard participated in joint exercises with the Russian 
airborne and Chinese police units, an effort to allow these elements to “figure out how 
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to work together in the future.”99 The National Guard, having assumed many of the 
duties of the Ministry of Interior, continues to be busy not just with its participation in 
exercises, but also with units helping to suppress unauthorized protests throughout 
Russia. 
National Guard riot police helped to break up anti-corruption protests in May 
and June 2017, where thousands of young people participated and hundreds were 
arrested.100 General Zolotov said that the true goals of the anti-corruption protests were 
the creation of chaos and instability.101 President Putin compared the protests to the 
Arab Spring and the Euromaidan in Ukraine, saying that it was this sort of tool that led 
to the Arab Spring and the chaos and coup in Ukraine.102 It also exactly the sort of tool 
that likely drove the president to shore up his defenses by ensuring he had an effective 
counter to protests such as these. 
Overall, the creation of the Russian National Guard shows the high importance 
that the Kremlin gives to combatting the threat of internal instability and political 
protests, and the continued use of force from elements of the MVD and now National 
Guard in order to control and disperse protests, such as the anti-corruption protests in 
May and June 2017, show that the government is going to be pro-active about 
minimizing the threat. This can be contrasted with the MOD’s efforts, which have 
resulted in the creation of the NDMC, but whose lack of additional action shows the 
low priority that the MOD gives the color revolution threat. 
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 NATIONAL DEFENSE MANAGEMENT CENTER B.
Two of the characteristics of modern conflict that General Gerasimov noted in 
2013 were the rapid pace at which crises develop and the need to integrate both military 
and non-military means in response.103 In his article on Russia’s experience in Syria, 
the need for the national leadership to be able to quickly and efficiently receive 
information and make decisions is something he specifically mentioned, noting that the 
NDMC was a good first step in the effort to allow quicker decision-making by the 
nation’s leadership in a crisis and to assist with operational coordination between 
Russia’s various ministries.104 
President Putin gave the decision to create the NDMC in May 2013, and it 
officially opened on December 1, 2014.105 As its name implies, the center is 
responsible for overseeing the territorial defense of Russia. To do this, it has two main 
functions: monitoring ongoing political and military events around the world and 
coordinating the government’s efforts to defend against internal and external threats. 
The NDMC is essentially an information hub that provides more complete and up-to-
date information to the nation’s leaders while at the same time providing accurate 
information about the current state of Russia’s forces, allowing for quicker decision 
making. 
These duties are split between the NDMC’s Center for Combat Management 
and the Center for Management of Day-to-Day Activity.106 The Center for Combat 
Management continually monitors, analyzes, and assesses current threats and forecasts 
future ones, allowing Russia to more quickly react as situations both inside and outside 
of Russia develop. It also manages the employment of Russian forces. The Center for 
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Management of Day-to-Day Activity monitors and manages support for Russia’s 
forces, including coordinating with Russia’s non-military federal agencies in order to 
better synchronize the government’s efforts.107 
To better synchronize efforts, the Russian government is currently in the process 
of expanding the reach of the national management center by creating regional and 
territorial management centers in order to strengthen the vertical connection and 
sharing of information between the national and local level. As of May 2017, the 
NDMC’s collaborative defense network includes 73 federal agencies, 85 sub-national 
components, and 1,320 state corporations and businesses related to the defense 
industry.108  
The NDMC is not only growing its network of sensors, it is also improving its 
capability to efficiently operate and share information. President Putin provided the 
legal basis for this information sharing in September 2014 with a presidential edict “On 
the procedure for collecting information in relation to Russian Federation defense 
issues and for exchanging that information.”109 The following year, the NDMC hosted 
a conference with the purpose of improving the technical means of sharing information 
between ministries and agencies. At the conference, General Gerasimov said that while 
much had been accomplished to improve the coordination of the “power ministries,” 
but much more still had yet to be accomplished. 
The creation of the NDMC goes a long way to alleviating the Russian 
government’s potential problems of being able to coordinate and synchronize a 
government response to crisis. However, while the consolidation of internal security 
forces and creation of the National Guard seems to be directly in response to the 
government’s fear of mass protests, the creation of the NDMC was likely more a 
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reaction to the need to coordinate operations abroad, such as in Ukraine and Syria, or to 
defend against an external threat, than from the need to defend against any internal 
threat to the current government. 
The MOD has done little to innovate and protect against a color revolution. It 
has expanded the number of military units designated for peacekeeping, adding an 
additional brigade and several battalions to its peacekeeping force,110 but the growth of 
Russia’s peacekeeping force cannot really be seen as any sort of innovation or major 
change, as the use of such forces and their assigned roles in national defense do not 
seem to have changed. Because of its peripheral position on what the military sees as its 
primary missions, while it may be a planning consideration, defending against a color 
revolution will likely not be a driving factor for any changes by Russia’s military. 
 STRENGTHENED COERCIVE CONTROL C.
There is no indication that the Russian government is prepared to drastically 
increase the level of violence used to suppress protests and internal instability. It simply 
appears that the government is prepared to use low levels of violence and coercion as 
frequently as necessary, and the creation of the National Guard seems to facilitate this 
quick and efficient use of low levels of violence and coercion, strengthening the 
Kremlin’s control over coercive power in Russia.  
Additionally, while the National Guard’s creation was likely in part a reaction to 
Russia’s history of revolution, it was not created until after the Arab Spring and the 
2011/2012 protests in Moscow, and not until President Putin had been in control of 
Russia for over 16 years. It is not exactly clear why the National Guard was not created 
until 2016, but this delay seems to imply that a perceived increase in the danger of a 
Russian color revolution and upcoming presidential elections may have played a part. 
The creation of the National Guard and the NDMC has certainly strengthened 
President Putin’s direct control over the coercive elements of power and his ability to 
synchronize any government response to a crisis, and it does seem more likely that this 
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control lessens the likelihood that forces such as the National Guard will lack the 
leadership that will support the government in the face of a large opposition. However, 
those forces’ capabilities to suppress any such opposition, even if improved, are still 
finite. For example, even though Ukraine’s security forces largely stayed neutral during 
the protests of the Orange Revolution, roughly 100,000 people protested on the first 
day, which then grew to approximately 500,000 by the third day, and eventually 
reached a million protesters.111 Even with the creation of the National Guard and the 
help of the army, it seems unlikely that such a crowd in Moscow could be dispersed 
without the use of large-scale violence. Therefore, Russia’s security forces will need 
help to ensure that protest movements are stopped before such growth can occur.   
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IV. SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Russia’s main coercive elements, its internal and external security forces, cannot 
be expected to handle the issue of organized political protests on their own. Even when 
those forces have the will to act, there is only so much that these forces can do to control 
massive protests. Both the Arab Spring and 2014 Ukrainian protests showed 
governments’ inability to deal with protest movements once they become so large as to 
overwhelm a country’s security apparatus. The protests in Moscow in 2011–2012 were 
the largest Russia had seen since 1993, but even these protests failed to attract the 
numbers seen in Kiev in 2004 and 2014 or in protests during the Arab Spring, like those 
seen in Cairo. 
Preventing protests from growing too large is essential to preventing a color 
revolution, because at some point, no security force can maintain control without the 
widespread use of violence, and large scale protests often signal that an autocratic regime 
may “already be playing a losing hand.”112 Russia’s success in developing supporting 
elements to its coercive forces will go a long way towards decreasing the likelihood of 
large-scale protests by helping to prevent sources of opposition from ever beginning, 
minimizing and disrupting threats to help prevent them from growing, and supporting the 
security forces’ ability to counter the threat. 
This section discusses the legal steps that the Russian government has taken to 
undercut international financial support for civil society while at the same time providing 
funding to select organizations. It examines the use of both the media and laws to disrupt 
and prevent the growth of demonstrations and protests, and it also looks at how pro-
government organizations can support the Russian government against the political 
opposition. Overall, the Russian government has created the tools necessary to support its 
security forces in suppressing any potential internal threats to the current regime, but the 
current use of those tools has been selective and an all-out attempt to subvert Russian 
civil society has not occurred.  
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  PREVENTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THREATS A.
Bunce and Wolchik argue that, when in conjunction with elections, success is 
based upon the opposition’s ability to follow the electoral model that emerged during the 
spread of democracy in post-communist states in the 1990s and early 2000s.113 Elements 
of this model include the ability for the opposition to unify behind one candidate, efforts 
to combat narratives from state-controlled media, the use of independent domestic and 
international election monitors, and the use of large, sustained demonstrations that show 
both the determination and strength of the opposition.114 During the 2000s, autocratic 
regimes adapted to the threat, and those that managed to defeat opposition movements 
largely did so because they were able to repress and split the opposition, isolate the 
opposition from foreign support, pacify civil society, and raise the cost for participation 
in protests.115  
Since the wave of electoral protest movements in the early 2000s, Russia has used 
several measures to undermine the Russian civil society’s ability to organize and support 
an opposition to the government. In 2006, the Russian government passed Federal Law 
No. 18-FZ, commonly referred to as the 2006 NGO Law, which increased the 
government’s ability to scrutinize NGOs. It forced organizations to re-register with the 
government and turn over detailed information on their finances and membership. It 
placed restrictions on foreign funding for some organizations and allowed the 
government to continue to monitor these groups’ activities.116 In 2012, Federal Law No. 
121-FZ, more commonly known as the “Foreign Agent Law,” came into being.117 After 
this time, Russian NGOs that participate in political activity, a wide-reaching and vague 
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category, must register as foreign agents if they receive funding from outside Russia. The 
government registered the first organization as a foreign agent in June 2013, and since 
then, 87 additional Russian non-profit organizations have been added to the list.118 
The Kremlin has not only taken steps to minimize, if not eliminate, foreign 
funding from Russian civil society, but it has also prohibited many foreign organizations 
from working in Russia all together or made it more difficult for them to do so. The 
government forced the closure of the British Council’s offices in St. Petersburg and 
Yekaterinburg in 2007.119 The following year, the World Wildlife Foundation, Ford 
Foundation, and the International Red Cross all lost their tax-exempt status.120 In October 
2012, the Russian government forced USAID to close down its offices and cancel all 
remaining programming because the organization was supposedly attempting to influence 
Russia’s political processes through its grant-based funding of Russian organizations.121 
Then, in 2015, President Putin signed Federal Law No 129-FZ, also known as the 
Undesirable Organizations Law. The law in very vague terms allows the government to 
declare an organization to be undesirable if it poses a threat to the security, public order, 
or health of Russia and its citizens. Undesirable groups are not permitted to maintain 
offices or distribute information in Russia, and Russian banks are required to notify the 
government of these organizations’ financial transactions.122  
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Among the most recent undesirable organizations are three groups founded by 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky.123 This was the first time that a group founded by a Russian and 
that focused solely on Russia had been deemed undesirable.124 Khodorkovsky, whose 
Open Russia Foundation supported civil society groups in Russia until shortly after his 
imprisonment, became an example of the dangers for Russians who support NGOs that 
lobby for any cause that can be deemed political, such as human rights issues. The overall 
effect of this has been to limit the fundraising ability of Russia’s civil society. In general, 
non-profit organizations, especially those that focus on human rights and political issues, 
find it difficult to raise funds domestically. 
While the Russian government has worked to suppress elements of civil society 
that it deems a threat, it has also worked to support groups that either stay out of anything 
deemed political or that support the Kremlin and its policies. The federal and regional 
Public Chambers created in 2005 allow government-approved elements of civil society to 
work with the government and attempt to influence policy. These Public Chambers also 
provide grants to local organizations, and in 2007 provided roughly $50 million to 1,225 
organizations.125 In 2013, the government budgeted a much larger amount, $258 million, 
for its annual grants program.126 The Public Chamber’s funding allows the government to 
support elements of civil society that are either supportive of or neutral towards the 
political status quo. Combined with a lack of large-scale private domestic donations and 
international funding, this makes Russia’s civil society more dependent upon continued 
government favor.127 
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 MINIMIZING AND DISRUPTING GROWING THREATS B.
The concept of diffusion explains how a small protest can grow larger and spread 
from one city to many other cities, as was seen in the pensioners’ protests in 2005.128 
Since the pensioners’ protests, preventing diffusion has become even more difficult as 
modern technology and the Internet have made communications methods more accessible 
and decentralized in the past decade. However, Russian authorities have taken several 
steps that can help to stop the growth and spread of protests. 
Russia’s media have assisted in the effort to contain the growth of protest 
movements, whether they be political or economic in nature. It frequently denigrates the 
motives of the organizations attempting to organize protests, accusing them of working 
for foreign entities, and greatly underrepresents the amount of support for and size of the 
protests in order to discourage people from joining. For example, during the pensioners’ 
protest, local television warned residents not to get involved in the protests, accused the 
protest organizers of being outsiders who took legitimate economic grievances and 
manipulated the local population into supporting politicized causes, and helped to 
encourage pro-government counter-protests.129 
The Russian media have also done the opposite with regard to its coverage of 
protests by simply ignoring them. As recently as the spring of 2017, Russian long-
distance truckers protested against increased tolls for using federal roads. These protests 
have spread over most parts of the country, and while estimates of the number of 
participants vary, as many as 10,000 truckers may have protested at some point.130 
However, while Russia’s mass media have covered the issue of anger about the increased 
tolls, the media have mostly been silent about the truckers’ protests. Even when the 
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National Guard and some regular army troops were necessary to help confront the 
protesters, the media failed to cover it. With the government also blocking a messaging 
app commonly used by long-distance truckers, protesters were largely on their own. Their 
inability to communicate with other protesters and learn about what was going on in other 
parts of the country with regards to the protest discouraged protesters from continuing in 
their efforts and limited the ability of the protests to inspire others to follow suit.131 
Apart from the media’s indirect effect to disrupt the ability for groups to organize 
and protest, the Russian government has taken legal steps to disrupt rallies, inhibit people 
from participating, and make it more difficult for organizers to hold subsequent events. 
Passed in conjunction with increased fines for participating in and organizing 
unauthorized rallies, new laws made event organizers responsible for the actions of their 
events’ attendees. This puts event organizers in a difficult position, because it is 
impossible to control exactly who attends events, and the organizers are held responsible 
for the actions even of those unaffiliated with the organizing group. This essentially gives 
pro-government groups the ability to create legal trouble for opposition organizers. Also, 
because events are authorized for a maximum number of demonstrators, outside groups 
who tag along at an event can also create trouble for the organizers. Infractions of either 
kind can lead to fines and a prohibition for the organizers of such an event to organize 
another one.132 
The Russian government has also worked to undercut protesters’ motivation 
during elections stemming from the perception of fraudulent elections. A critical point of 
vulnerability for autocratic governments occurs during elections, which by definition 
necessitate some sort of political competition, even if it is in name only. In elections 
frequently riddled with fraud, outside election monitors conducting exit polling and 
parallel vote tabulation have played a large role in documenting how incumbent regimes 
have used their strength to corrupt the process in order to remain in power, and these 
outside election monitors played a large role in the success of the color revolutions in the 
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early 2000s.133 Part of what helped to mobilize people to protest against Slobodan 
Milosevic after the Serbian presidential elections in 2000 was that people generally 
believed that the election results publicized by the Serbian NGO, the Center for Elections 
and Democracy, were in fact the real results, as opposed to those published by the 
government.134  
Russia has led the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries in 
pushing back against such “selective increased attention” and “double standards” from 
independent and international election monitors.135 It has attempted to both slow down 
the publication of any reports from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) election monitors and to require each member state to concur with the 
OSCE election monitors’ conclusions before their publication. Russia has also led efforts 
to create “zombie election monitors” that work to undercut traditional election 
monitoring groups by contradicting them and certifying that an election was free and 
fair.136 Founded in Russia in 2003, the CIS Election Monitoring Organization declared 
every election in CIS countries through 2006 to have been free and fair, with one 
exception. That exception was the rerun of Ukraine’s presidential election in 2004 in 
which Russia’s preferred candidate, Victor Yanukovich, was defeated. The CIS Election 
Monitoring Organization has continued to certify elections since then and generally 
comes to the opposite conclusion about the legitimacy of an election from that of the 
OSCE.137  
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 SUPPORTING RUSSIA’S SECURITY FORCES TO COPE WITH C.
THREATS 
The Russian government has numerous organizations that can be used as tools to 
control and disperse protests and political opposition movement. However, because the 
Russian government does not have blanket censorship over information, especially on the 
Internet, and Russian citizens do enjoy political freedoms, more pressure is placed on the 
country’s coercive organizations when organized political opposition emerges, and these 
organizations are “more restricted in the application of open coercion than is typically the 
case in closed authoritarian regimes.”138  
However, Russia’s security organizations do have some support in this effort. One 
element supporting Russia’s internal security forces are groups that call themselves 
Cossacks.139 In September 2012, President Putin signed a Cossack development plan that 
allowed for these self-described Cossack groups to be hired on a contractual basis in 
order to, among other things, assist the police in protecting public order.140 When 
sufficient numbers of official police and security are not available to handle security for 
events and infrastructure, or during large protests, the Cossacks may be an efficient and 
effective supplement to the security that the government can provide.141 In the past, they 
have been used to break up rallies and other events, and during the Winter Olympics in 
Sochi, almost a thousand Cossacks helped to provide security, supplementing the police 
presence at transportation infrastructure sites and at competition venues.142 
Other groups also exist that could, in theory, come to the government’s aid in a 
time of crisis. The motorcycle group Night Wolves is one such group. The Night Wolves 
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are proud supporters of the government and Orthodox Church, and while they have not 
taken an active role in suppressing protests inside Russia, they have participated in events 
outside of the country, receiving recognition from the Russian government for assisting 
in actions leading up to Crimea’s annexation. The group was also present in Lugansk in 
early 2014, where it assisted in raising the first barricades in the city during the 
beginnings of eastern Ukraine’s separatist movement.143 
The government has also helped to develop organizations that indirectly counter 
opposition groups. One such group that the government used in the past was the Russian 
youth movement, Nashi, which had been used to undercut opposition protests. During the 
2007 elections, Nashi organized a rally of 15,000 pro-government youth, demonstrating 
support for Putin’s regime and pushing out any possible opposition rallies. As Vladimir 
Frolov of the Fund for Effective Politics said, “Nashi’s job will be to occupy every public 
square in front of every public building of importance…Nashi is a weapon against 
nationalist popular movements like the ones that brought Mikhail Saakashvili and Victor 
Yushchenko to power.”144 The Kremlin got this “weapon” for cheap, costing only 
unofficial support and 6 million and 15 million rubles through the awarding of grants in 
2007 and 2008, respectively.145 
 AN INCOMPLETE AND HALF-HEARTED SUPPRESSION OF CIVIL D.
SOCIETY 
The Russian government’s actions and the other elements discussed earlier do 
have the overall effect of decreasing the possibility of a large and organized political 
opposition movement from developing, and they support the country’s security forces in 
suppressing those that might. However, these actions should not be perceived as a 
coordinated and well-executed strategy, and their sole purpose should not be thought of 
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as suppressing a color revolution. The government’s development of new laws pertaining 
to civil society is a good example of the lack of a tightly coordinated strategy, while its 
funding for civil society provides an example of the lack of a singular purpose. 
The 2012 Foreign Agents Law was ambiguous as to which organizations would 
classify as a foreign agent, and it also saw only periodic government interest in enforcing 
the law. After the law went into effect, many organizations simply refused to register as 
foreign agents, and the Justice Ministry showed a general disinterest in seeking action 
against them. In January 2013, the Justice Ministry declared that it could take up to two 
years to determine the process for declaring an organization to be a foreign agent, and 
then in February, the ministry decided not to declare either the Levada Center or Golos to 
be foreign agents.146 However, after President Putin addressed the Federal Security 
Service (FSB) leadership later in the month, making it clear that the law should be 
enforced, hundreds of investigations began looking at civil society organizations. By that 
July, Yury Chaika, Russia’s Prosecutor General, announced that the government had 
found 22 organizations working as foreign agents.147 However, the campaign against 
foreign agents died out after that summer just as quickly as it had started, and “[w]hat had 
seemed like an intense crackdown, suddenly lost steam, leaving the NGOs to continue 
working, but always in doubt about their ultimate fate.”148  
Like the introduction of laws affecting Russia’s civil society, Russia’s funding of 
civil society groups through the Public Chamber’s annual grant program also lacks the 
singular focus and concerted effort one would expect if this were simply an attempt to 
undermine Russia’s political opposition. The Public Chamber’s grant program has not 
been one sided in its support for pro-government organizations. For example, the Night 
Wolves had received some funding every year since 2012, but even though they applied 
for funding in 2017, the group was not among the winning grantees. Additionally, several 
groups that had previously been determined by the Justice Ministry to be foreign 
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agents—the NGO Development Center, the Samara Province charitable fund, and the 
Levada Center—all received government grants in 2017.149 
Russia’s enforcement of its laws affecting NGOs and its funding of civil society 
may be a case of the right hand not talking to the left, meaning not all parts of the 
government are coordinating their efforts to undermine potential support for the political 
opposition, or it may be that the steps the Russian government has taken do not have the 
singular purpose of undermining such potential support. Either way, the laws still remain 
on the books; the Russian government has a much tighter control over the funding of civil 
society within its borders; and it still has organizations that can help the security forces 
deter and suppress any large-scale protests. 
The government’s actions have shown an ability to inhibit the diffusion of 
protests throughout Russia, but one of the most discussed causes of the color revolutions 
is the diffusion of ideas and methods not within countries, but from country to country. In 
order to prevent events abroad from emboldening Russia’s internal opposition and 
increasing the chances of a Russian color revolution, the Russian military needs to 
support its allies and help those countries prevent color revolutions of their own. 
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V. PARTNERS AND ALLIES 
Russia frequently acts as what Jakob Tolstrup describes as a “black knight.” 
Black knights are “external actors…that act as guardians of autocracy or challengers of 
democracy.”150 As a black knight, Russia acts according to what it sees as its best 
interests, desiring to have like-minded neighbors and stability in its region. Russia’s 
desire for like-minded neighbors is understandable, for just as democracies tend to 
promote democracy, autocracies tend to promote other autocratic regimes.151 
While autocrats, and in this case Russia, generally prefer to have like-minded 
neighbors, Russia also needs allies who can help to prevent the diffusion of color 
revolutions. While some scholars downplay the importance of diffusion as an important 
variable leading to non-violent regime changes, others argue that it is one of the more 
important factors in a successful revolution.152 If Russia wants to decrease the likelihood 
of mass protests aimed at regime change in Russia, then it must not simply suppress the 
protest potential of its own people, but must focus on its neighbors as well, making an 
ideological forward line of defense beyond Russia’s borders a necessity. This idea was 
summed by Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, now the President of the Academy for 
Geopolitical Problems, when he said that “preventing ‘color revolutions’ means not only 
operations directly on our own territory, but also protecting our neighbors and allies. In 
the present situation, we must arm Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan and help 
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Turkmenistan, where soon things may flare up, and then other countries will follow in a 
chain reaction.”153  
Efforts to predict, prevent, and defeat color revolutions cannot be a Russian 
priority alone if those efforts are to be effective. As a part of Russia’s desire to keep 
liberal democracy at bay and support the status quo among its autocratic neighbors, those 
same neighbors’ support is crucial. Russia has done this through the CIS and the 
previously mentioned CIS Election Monitoring Organization, but it is also attempting to 
do this through the collective security function of the CSTO.154 CSTO support may be 
crucial in providing legitimacy to any Russian interventions abroad in former Soviet 
countries, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for the separatist 
movement in Lugansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.  
This section examines the possibility of Russian support to one of its neighbors in 
the event of an attempted color revolution and the assistance other CSTO members may 
provide as well. It also looks at the level of political support that Russia’s closest allies 
have provided in support of Russian actions abroad. It shows that while the mechanisms 
exist for Russia and the CSTO as a whole to assist its neighbors during an attempted 
color revolution, CSTO approval for intervention is unlikely, and the CSTO countries are 
apathetic in their support for Russian intervention abroad. 
 RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR LIKE-MINDED ALLIES A.
In order for Russia to more effectively protect stability and autocracy in its 
geographic neighborhood, Russia must maintain the support of its allies, and the most 
likely source of such support is the CSTO. Article 2 of the CSTO’s founding agreement 
on collective security states that when a member faces a threat to its security, sovereignty, 
or territorial integrity, the other member states shall coordinate their response and take 
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steps to eliminate the threat.155 While the purpose of CSTO in the minds of the leaders 
who signed on to it may have begun as one of collective defense from external military 
threats, like NATO’s Article 5, the color revolutions of the early 2000s may have 
influenced those leaders who prefer the current status quo in their countries to see the 
CSTO as a way of enlisting Russian support against internal regime opponents.156  
One of the CSTO’s guiding principles is collective defense against external 
aggression, but could this be used to justify a CSTO role against internal discord within 
member states as well? Starting in 2011, Russian officials began encouraging a debate in 
the CSTO about allowing outside assistance in a member country because of that 
country’s internal instability.157 This argument has not come out of nowhere. It follows 
an ongoing series of CSTO exercises that seem to point to the possibility of CSTO joint 
forces being used in such a way. 
After the color revolutions of the early 2000s, several CSTO exercises seemed to 
focus on legitimizing international cooperation to defeat foreign attempts to support a 
domestic opposition whose goal was regime change.158 In 2005, exercises took place in 
Tajikistan in the immediate aftermath of the Tulip Revolution in nearby Kyrgyzstan. 
During the exercises, CSTO units fought an enemy attempting to use popular discontent 
with an election to overthrow the incumbent government. An exercise the following year, 
Frontier-2006, had a similar scenario, where in the aftermath of an election, an external 
force, this time a terrorist organization, was attempting to create an Islamic caliphate in 
the Central Asian region. Additionally, Frontier-2006 also included a “brown” force that 
represented a non-CSTO nation state attempting to take advantage of the situation in 
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order to expand its influence in the region.159 Tsentr-2011 was another exercise in which 
units from CSTO countries participated toward a similar purpose. Among one of the 
largest joint exercises up to that point with around 12,000 soldiers participating, the 
exercise focused on responding to scenarios similar to the instability and mass protests 
that had recently been seen in Syria and Libya.160  
More recently, Russia has expanded its potential set of allies by conducting an 
exercise in 2015 with Serbia. Slavic Brotherhood 2015 saw Serbian troops training with 
Russians and Belarusians in order to prevent a repeat of what happened in Ukraine in 
2014. The exercise focused on “preventing unrest and agitation” and “detecting and 
destroying the training center for illegal armed groups.”161 However, while joint 
exercises are great for building relationships between military forces and for improving 
joint interoperability, they don’t necessarily translate into the willingness or ability to use 
those joint forces during a crisis, which is something the CSTO has yet to do. 
Kyrgyzstan experienced such a crisis starting in April 2010 during a reversal of 
the Tulip Revolution. Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted from power in Bishkek, and 
several months later, ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan left several thousand people 
dead and several hundred thousand internally displaced. While Russia did send a few 
hundred soldiers to reinforce its existing military locations, neither it nor any of the other 
CSTO countries did anything to stop the violence or re-stabilize the country.  
Russia’s non-intervention may have been because it was behind the effort to 
unseat Bakiyev from power in the first place.162 Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to 
that reason, Russia may have realized that it lacked both an adequately trained force and 
the political will to intervene.163 Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Secretary General of the CSTO 
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at the time, stated that the conflict in Kyrgyzstan was “purely a domestic affair.”164 
President Medvedev stated that, “only in the case of a foreign intrusion and an attempt to 
externally seize power can we state that there is an attack against the CSTO.”165 In 
reaction to the CSTO’s lack of assistance to Kyrgyzstan, President Alexander 
Lukashenko of Belarus said, “[w]hat sort of organization is this one, if there is bloodshed 
in one of our member states and an anti-constitutional coup d’état takes place, and this 
body keeps silent?”166 
Part of the problem with any external response to defend against a color 
revolution in the CSTO can be that deciding whether or not foreign intrusion and an 
external attempt to seize power has occurred is very subjective. For example, a strong 
case can be made that the West had a direct hand in the electoral defeat of Slobodan 
Milosevic in 2000 as a part of the Bulldozer Revolution, but the case for direct Western 
involvement in the Tulip Revolution or the Arab Spring is much weaker. As a result, it is 
very unclear as to when CSTO support for one of its members is required, and if the 
legitimacy of a post-election government is in debate, it may also be unclear if CSTO 
intervention is allowed.  
 CSTO SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN ACTIONS ABROAD B.
While Russia has established the mechanisms to intervene outside its borders on a 
multilateral basis, its interventions thus far have been done unilaterally. Russia chose not 
to get CSTO permission for its actions in the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. Perhaps it 
chose not to because of the delay such CSTO consultations would require, or perhaps it 
was because of the limitations that CSTO concurrence / participation might place on 
Russian actions. However, in September 2008, the CSTO countries did condemn 
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Georgia’s actions in the lead-up to the conflict.167 The CSTO response to the war seems 
to justify Russia’s actions, but it falls short of endorsing them. Associated with the 
conflict in Georgia, Russia is the only country in the CSTO or larger CIS to formally 
recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, which is just another example 
of Russia’s inability to garner its allies’ public support for Russia’s preferred policies. 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine provide another example of the CSTO countries 
providing an almost half-hearted acceptance of Russian actions. Except for the 
organization’s Secretary General, the CSTO has been largely silent on what is occurring 
in Ukraine. The United Nations resolution on Russia’s annexation of Crimea provided a 
mixed result for Russia as well. While Armenia and Belarus sided with Russia by 
recognizing Crimea’s right to vote to secede from Ukraine and join Russia, initially, 
Kazakhstan abstained and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan did not participate in the voting at 
all.168  
When Russia intervened in Syria on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s government in 
order to defend against what Russia would describe as an ongoing color revolution, it 
again did so absent any support from CSTO or CIS countries. Done largely at the behest 
of the Iranians, Russia’s response is an example of its support for its autocratic allies.169 
This unilateral intervention could change to a multilateral one if Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, who are reportedly open to the idea of supporting a CSTO peacekeeping 
mission in Syria under the right conditions, were to provide forces to support Russia’s 
efforts at protecting Assad.170 However, this seems unlikely, and from a practical 
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standpoint, legal restrictions make it difficult for either country to send its forces abroad 
even if its leaders wished to do so.171 
 RUSSIA’S APATHETIC ANTI-COLOR REVOLUTION ALLIES C.
The level of political support that Russia receives from its allies is largely 
lukewarm, where they refrain from outright defiance of Moscow’s wishes but do not put 
themselves out on a limb in support of their larger neighbor. Russia has been able to get 
some cooperation concerning the ability to use CSTO forces in response to internal 
aggression, but has not been able to get full agreement on the ability to use such a force 
in practice.172 For example, while Belarussian President Lukashenko condemned the 
CSTO’s lack of action in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, Belarus generally abstains from CSTO 
activities in the Central Asian States anyway, and the other Central Asian members of the 
CSTO were supposedly opposed to any intervention in the Kyrgyz crisis even though 
Kyrgyzstan’s transitional government did ask for Russian military assistance in June of 
that year.173 
The CSTO’s Secretary General has addressed this general issue of a lack of 
unified CSTO action. Bordyuzha has said that he recognizes the difficulty in getting the 
CSTO members to approve a timely response when situations are constantly changing, 
that the presence of an external actor may be debated and make any potential response 
more difficult, and that there remains a requirement for the recognized authority in a 
country to approve a CSTO-led intervention in order for it to be legal.174 Russia has 
attempted to simplify or eliminate these problems, but changes to the CSTO that might 
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strengthen Russia’s ability to intervene in a conflict without full CSTO support have not 
been forthcoming.175  
Exercises are another symptom of this half-hearted desire to support Moscow’s 
goals and do not truly demonstrate a commitment to action by any of the countries 
involved. This is a common theme seen even when other major powers host exercises. 
Smaller countries are more than willing to participate in exercises sponsored by their 
larger allies when the financial costs involved for the participating countries are small 
compared to the training, support, and sometimes military infrastructure that the larger 
country provides. For example, the importance of Serbia’s participation in Slavic 
Brotherhood 2015 should not be overstated, since the Serbs provided only one company 
of soldiers, and Russia shouldered the burden of that company’s transportation to and 
from the event as well as providing the equipment and supplies that the Serbs needed to 
participate.176 
Even Belarus, Russia’s partner in the Union State and in Zapad 2017, seems to be 
hesitant about and not fully supportive of its larger neighbor. Belarus approved its most 
recent military doctrine in January 2016, and Russia seems to have convinced its Union 
State partner that the threat of a color revolution is real, as color revolutions appear to 
now be a top security threat for Belarus.177 The same appears to be true for Kazakhstan, 
who recently inserted similar language into its new military doctrine.178 The problem for 
Russia, however, is that both of these two CSTO members also appear to believe that 
Russia as well as the West could be the external source for color revolutions in their 
country. Russia may deny involvement in eastern Ukraine, but its neighbors certainly 
don’t seem to believe it, and this will make it even more difficult for Russia to get the 
support and cooperation from its neighbors that it may need in the future. 
                                                 
175 Vladimir Socor, “Medvedev’s Think-Tank Proposes Reinforcing Russia-Led CSTO (Part Two),” 
Jamestown Foundation, September 9, 2011, https://jamestown.org/program/medvedevs-think-tank-
proposes-reinforcing-russia-led-csto-part-two/. 
176 Sputnik News, “‘Slavic Brotherhood’ Exercises Aimed at Crushing Potential Maidan Scenario.” 
177 Yauheni Preiherman, “Belarus Prepares to Adopt New Military Doctrine,” Jamestown, accessed 
November 3, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/belarus-prepares-to-adopt-new-military-doctrine/. 
178 Anna Gussarova, “Kazakhstan Adopts New Military Doctrine,” Jamestown, October 23, 2017, 
https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-adopts-new-military-doctrine/. 
 59 
With the possible exception of its actions in Syria, where Russia acted without 
CSTO support but where it did have Iranian support, Russia has yet to obtain truly 
external support for its military actions outside its borders. Its unilateral actions in 
Georgia and Ukraine certainly have not helped to build trust between Russia and the 
other former communist states and may be one reason that none of them have backed up 
words of support for Russia with deeds. While the example of Russia in Syria seems to 
confirm that Russia may indeed be willing to come to the aid of one of its autocratic 
allies in crisis, it still seems unlikely that one of those neighbors will ask for Russian 
assistance before the situation has gotten too far out of control for the Russian military to 
do anything other than help fight a war. 
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At some level, color revolutions are perceived in both the Russian MOD and the 
Kremlin to be threats. In speaking about the color revolution threat and the influence 
foreign organizations such as the U.S.’s National Endowment for Democracy have on 
internal political conditions in Russia, General Baluyevsky said that he “cannot believe in 
the altruism and disinterest of the generous American donors. Such funds are only used 
for brainwashing.”179 His opinion depicts a cultural difference between Russia and the 
United States, and it may be part of the cause for Russians to see a link between external 
forces and the color revolution threat where others do not. The Russians link the efforts 
of Western government agencies, privately-funded foundations, and former military 
officers as working in common cause to undermine the internal stability of other 




In the early 2000s, this threat was not taken as seriously in Russia, perhaps 
because of President Putin’s high approval rating and the rising standard of living in 
Russia, but since the Arab Spring and the 2011/2012 Moscow protests, the color 
revolution threat has been widely discussed. Those Russians discussing the threat have 
hit upon most of its elements, such as the use of peaceful protests, the organizing role of 
domestic civil society with some level of support from foreign organizations, and the role 
of youth in social movements. Curiously though, while color revolutions are most 
commonly understood as taking place in conjunction with either presidential or 
parliamentary elections, only Belsky and Klimenko discuss this connection. This is 
especially worth noting, because if a Russian color revolution should ever occur, it seems 
most likely that it would occur in conjunction with a national-level election. 
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While the color revolution threat seems to be understood reasonably well in 
Russia, even if there is an overemphasis on the role that the West has played in its 
development, the reactions from the MOD and the Kremlin have differed. This thesis 
examined two possible sources that may have affected the MOD’s response: bureaucracy 
and Russian military culture. One of those sources, bureaucracy, also affects the 
bureaucratic machine that runs the Kremlin, but Russia’s military culture may be playing 
a role in why the MOD’s response has been both smaller and slower to develop than 
other non-military efforts. 
The Kremlin’s non-military efforts to minimize the threat of a color revolution, 
such as cutting off Russian civil society from sources of foreign funding, were largely 
carried out in the years immediately after the color revolutions of the early 2000s. This 
response may have initially satisfied those in the Kremlin that felt most threatened, but 
the 2011/2012 Moscow protests laid against the backdrop of a Russian economy in 
decline and the ongoing Arab Spring protests may have convinced many in the Kremlin 
that a Russian color revolution might actually be possible. This may have been a driving 
factor for the increased attention paid to the threat starting in 2012. The escalation in the 
perceived color revolution threat may have also prompted President Putin to push the 
MOD into at least some sort of reaction, even though the MOD still has yet to make any 
major changes specifically related to defending against a color revolution. 
The NDMC will certainly help Russia coordinate a response to any internal or 
external crisis, but its creation is more a reaction to the changing nature of war and not 
specifically because of the color revolution threat. While Russia’s military operation in 
Syria can be seen as an attempt to defend against a color revolution, Russia’s intervention 
did not come until it was clear that Assad would be ousted from power without additional 
assistance. Likewise, the Russians did not act in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, and they did not act 
in Ukraine in 2013. In Ukraine, their response only came as a “counterattack” once 
President Yushchenko had already lost power. Should a serious internal crisis break out 
in Central Asia or Belarus, it remains to be seen whether or not the effected country 
would welcome Russian / CSTO assistance, and even if it did, it remains to be seen if 
Russia would act in time.  
 63 
In the end, the asymmetry between Russia’s military and non-military responses 
may not matter. Russia’s non-military efforts have undercut the ability of any person or 
organization to create the organized political opposition that would be necessary to 
seriously challenge President Putin electorally. Even if a group did manage to organize 
large protests like the ones seen in Moscow in 2011 and 2012, the creation of the 
National Guard provides the government with a more reliable and effective tool to help 
prevent such protests’ growth. The military, while still very relevant for Russian 
offensive efforts to change the status quo abroad, has less to do with protecting the 
current status quo at home. 
As a spectator to Russia’s reaction to the color revolution threat, the West must 
understand how its democratization efforts in the 1990s and 2000s helped to drive the 
Russian reaction. This reaction includes Russia’s efforts to defend against the threat, and 
also how Russia is currently using its lessons learned to expand Russian influence. 
Further research should look at how Russia’s understanding of color revolutions has 
influenced its non-military efforts in Europe and the Unites States. Additionally, future 
research should look at what Western countries can learn from Russia’s defensive efforts, 
using that knowledge to strengthen their own defenses against Russian influence in their 
society, politics, and elections. Such understanding will be essential if Russia ever tries to 
create its own color revolution. 
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